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Recurrent capital

The CCA comprises the Governors of the BIS member central banks in the Americas region 1 . It was established in May 2008 to facilitate communication between the members of the BIS in the Americas and the Bank's Board and Management on matters of interest and concern to the central bank community in the region. The BIS Representative Office for the Americas provides the Secretariat for the CCA.

Recurrent capital inflows pose important challenges for authorities in emerging market economies seeking to preserve financial stability. Raising interest rates to dampen imbalances that could arise from capital flows can also attract more capital inflows and accentuate appreciation pressures. For this reason authorities have used a number of instruments to mitigate the effects of capital flows, all with financial stability implications. Many of these instruments (eg reserve requirements) may have been used for other purposes but the global financial crisis has raised interest in examining them from a financial stability, or "macroprudential" perspective. This paper reviews some of these instruments, drawing in part on material provided by central banks to the BIS. The instruments include foreign exchange market intervention and foreign reserve accumulation; measures to strengthen bank balance sheets and capital and measures to maintain the quality of credit or to ifnluence credit growth or allocation, and capital controls. Certain implementation issues are also discussed, including signals to respond to, timing of prudential measures and procyclicality and effectiveness and calibration. An unresolved question is how the instruments described are to be used in conjunction with interest rate policy. Over the medium term, these instruments raise concerns because they may impair the development of the financial system. During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we do not find that superior forecasting capacities can explain the agencies' growing importance.

  • During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we do not find that superior forecasting capacities can explain the agencies' growing importance.
  • Publications & research

The Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) was established in February 2010 by the chairs of the Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to coordinate an assessment of the macroeconomic implications of the Basel Committee's proposed reforms. The membership of the MAG comprises macroeconomic modelling experts from central banks and regulators in 15 countries and a number of international institutions. Stephen Cecchetti, Economic Adviser of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), was asked to chair the Group.

This paper asks why Asia-Pacific residents issue debt in offshore markets and considers the implications for domestic debt markets. We use unit record data for bond issuance by non-government residents of Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and Singapore to link the decision to issue offshore to potential benefits. The results suggest that residents of smaller markets issue bonds offshore to arbitrage price differentials; to access foreign investors; and to issue larger, lower-rated or longer-maturity bonds. These bond characteristics tend to be correlated with offshore bond market size. The results support the notions that (i) deviations from covered interest parity are actively arbitraged by residents of minor currency areas, as well as by internationally active borrowers, as established in the literature; and (ii) issuers benefit from the liquidity and diversification of larger "complete" offshore markets. Against the potential benefits to borrowers, we consider the risks for both borrowers and the domestic market, and lessons from the ongoing financial crisis such as the benefits of funding diversification.